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Illegal gold mining is arguably the most challenging national issue in Ghana today. This unbridled 
rush for gold has unleashed inestimable damages to the economy of Ghana including child labor, 
environmental stress, loss of tax revenue, and health crises in mining communities. As a limit to 
growth commodity, gold in Ghana will eventually become exhausted, either sooner or later. The 
ideal condition will therefore be to formalize the sector in a practically sustainable way. This thesis 
considers how the small-scale mines in Ghana can be formalized using the self-organized type of 
governance. In this system of governance, the indigenous miners are actively involved in creating 
and enforcing rules that govern the sector. When this happens, resource boundaries and resource 
users are clearly specified, effectively excluding foreigner from partaking in small-scale mining 
activities. Using a system dynamics model as an analytical tool, results show what amount of tax 
is needed to sustain the small-scale mining sector whilst ensuring a thorough care for the 
environment by the miners themselves.  A win-win result ensues as the sector will provide a good 
measure of income to investors, greatly reduce the unemployment rate, whilst government will be 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
1.1 Introduction 
This study seeks to address one the most (if not the most) challenging issue on the soils of Ghana 
today. The challenge in question is the illegal mining activities which is bedeviling the Artisanal 
and Small-Scale Mining sector of the country. Like a bad and never healing sore, this issue of 
illegal mining popularly known as galamsey (a compound word which literally means “gather and 
sell”) has been tormenting government, concerned citizens and policy makers alike, especially 
since the hike in gold price in 2008.  
 The study commences by revealing how the government of Ghana has attempted to sanitize the 
Small-Scale Mining sector with various interventions and how the sector has responded to these 
measures. Then, it highlights some challenges confronting the nation due to the galamsey menace 
at hand. It further discusses the system of management that would probably be ideal for a 
sustainable management of the gold resource, which is the Self-Organized regime. This regime 
clearly defines users and boundaries of the resource making it easy to limit the influx of foreigners 
into the sector (Ostrom, 1999). It also ensures that, the indigenous people are actively involved in 
designing rules that govern the management of the resource. As revealed in settings where this 
style of management has been tested, the users will most likely respect the rules and ensure the 
smooth functioning of the rules since they have a hand in enacting these regulations. It is evident 
from the study that, the unbridled nature of returns on investment is the motivation behind this 
menace and an introduction of reasonable tax would likely provide win-win results for both the 
government and the illegal miners. 
1.2 Background 
As one of the earliest and most important industries in human history, mining has been a core part 
of our lives until today. Any mineral that is taken from beneath the earth surface, that is, the act of 
poking into the earth (surface or underground) to extract minerals, is mining (Amponsah, 2011). 
About 100 million people in the world depend on small-scale mining for a living (World-Bank, 




manganese. Their availability in a country can contribute significantly to economic growth and 
development. 
Ghana is blessed with enough of natural mineral resources, especially gold. Truth about this matter 
is reflected on how this country was formerly known as – Gold coast – due to the large deposit of 
gold on its shores. Usually the second largest gold producer in Africa (behind South Africa), recent 
reports indicates that Ghana has been the largest gold producing country in Africa since 2019. 
(Smith, 2019) and places  itself at the 7th position on the list of world gold producers (Holmes, 
2020).  
But operational challenges such as finances, robust institutions and legal framework for managing 
the sector was very initially confronting. This resulted in a no new mine being opened for about 
four decades until 1980.(Tienhaara, 2006). However, a flood gate of mines creation was opened 
when the government intervened with policies such as the Economic Recovery Program (ERP) in 
1983. (Hilson, 2004).  Among the objectives for the Economic Recovery Program included the 
enticement of investors into the mining sector, alongside some other key areas to help boost the 
general economy of the country (Addy, 1998). 
Evidence of the success story of this intervention is a matter of records. When referencing 
information disclosed by the Ghana mineral commission, Aryee recounted that, the mining 
industry received about US$4 billion of private investment capital. This money, among other 
things, were purported for mineral exploration, setting up of new mines and also for the improving 
those already in place (Aryee, 2001). Among the then existing mining companies whose 
transformation became clearly noticeable was Ashanti Goldfields Company. According to Nikoi 
(NIKOI, 2015), Ashanti goldfields mines was a small entity prior to the ERP reform. Soon after 
its implementation, Ashanti Goldfield Company became a universal mining giant, being counted 
as one of the multinational gold companies and appeared on the list of six international financial 
markets. Some 237 mining companies joined the pool of mines from when the reform was 
introduced until 1998. (Aryee, 2001).  
The reformation also catalyzed the mining sector’s contribution to domestic export dividends. 




40% in 1992 and has been the best performing sector of the country since. (Aryee, 2001). Thus 
far, the mining sector has come of age by means of the strategic investments made. 
Furthermore, a gist of the value of the small-scale artisanal mining sector is evident in the total 
workforce is employs. Today, this sector locally known as Galamsey (a composite word derived 
from ‘gather’ and ‘sell’) employs about one million people and supports just about 4.5 million 
more (about 15% of the Ghanaian population) (McQuilken & Hilson , 2016). Artisanal and Small-
scale Mines contributes to more than 60 percent of Ghana’s total mining labor force (Leudi, 2019). 
In 2013, gold exports from ASM operators accounted for 34 percent of Ghana’s total gold export, 
which equaled the total contribution of the three largest multinational companies in the country. 
(Abdulai, 2017). It is indeed a great anchor to the mining and mineral sector and a key ingredient 
to the entire economy of the nation at large. 
1.2 Problem Identification 
Mining activities in Ghana can be grouped into small-scale and large-scale mining. Small-scale 
mining usually requires less capital investment and mostly undertaken by a group of handicraft 
workers. It is important to note that, while foreigners are the main actors of the large-scale mining 
sector in Ghana, small-scale mining activities are statutorily restricted to only Ghanaians. (Leudi, 
2019). 
However, despite the high degree of sanity in the mining sector as a result of the interventions 
discussed above, one of the most noteworthy policy challenges in Ghana today spins around the 
question of how best to formalize and maximize the benefits of the Artisanal and Small-Scale 
Mining (ASM) sector while concurrently curtailing the disturbing setbacks bedeviling it. 
Although Ghana has had a formalized process for engaging in ASM on legal basis since the late 
1980s, an estimated 85 percent of small-scale miners in the country operate on illegal basis. 
(Abdulai, 2017) Popularly known as galamsey, illegal mining has had significant adverse 
implications in Ghana, including but not limited to the following.  
Notably among the many challenges posed by illegal artisanal mining in loss of revenue. While 




$2.2 billion in 2016 in uncollected tax alone (Bird, 2017). Similarly, illegal gold exports to the 
UAE – often reported to be carried in hand luggage on planes – have raised worrying concerns. 
Just in 2017 alone, the President of the country, Nana Akufo-Addo, observed a $5 billion 
discrepancy between trade statistics and actual gold exports. (Nwokolo, 2019). There are 
widespread claims that gold is mostly smuggled to China and India. (Lewis, et al., 2019). This 
means that, the informal nature of the sector is costing the country billions of US dollars each year. 
Again, when referencing Ampomah (Executive Secretary of the Water Resource Commission), 
Mubarik asserted that, illegal mining activities accounts for about 60% of water pollution in Ghana 
(Mubarik, 2017). Arguably, it is claimed to be the most worrying challenge confronting water 
bodies in Ghana is galamsey. (Amagyei, 2017). Streams, lakes and rivers alike in small-scale 
mining zones are hugely polluted by mercury and other machineries used in digging for gold. The 
consequence of this incalculable damage to rivers and other water bodies is reflected in the most 
current anti-galamsey protest called “operation halt galamsey” spearheaded by the president of the 
nation. In this operation any suspected excavator and or other mining equipment are set ablaze by 
the military crackdown team when they chance upon them around water bodies. This recounts the 
gravity of pollution illegal mining has done to water bodies in the nation. (Ackaah-Kwarteng, 
2021)  
For example, major river bodies such as Pra, Birim and Offin rivers that are primary source of 
fresh water supply for most part of the nation (Ashanti, Eastern and Central regions respectively) 
has undergone severe polluted (Alhassan, 2014). Some galamsey operators also invade the main 
intake points of the Ghana Water Company (GWC) of these primary water bodies to undertake 
their activities, thereby blocking the supply of water. Others also divert these water course for 
mining purposes. The intensity of the problem is summed up in the comment made by Carl Fiati, 
the Director for Natural Resources and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Allotey 
(Allotey, 2018) quoted Carl Fiati on the danger illegal mining activities poses on water supply 
saying “We anticipated this problem long time ago that it’s going to come a time when we continue 
the way we are going as a country, we are going to destroy all our water bodies and import water 
for drinking,” Mr. Fiati added. ‘Already, some major water treatment plants have been shut done 




water treatment plants.’ (Allotey, 2018). The immeasurable effect of illegal mining on the water 
bodies in the nation has rightly been tagged as ‘the dangerous couple’ by Plá,  (Plá, 2020). Aquatic 
lives too are in serious danger and many species are at a brink of extinction, to say the least, due 
to the continue growing intensity of water pollution by illegal mining activities. 
Closely linked to the water crises is health predicaments. For example, cyanide which is a core 
ingredient for gold extraction can enter nearby streams and other water bodies close by and 
eventually victimizes those who depend on it. A study has revealed that cyanide spills from a mine 
has appeared in the water supplies of adjacent homes. (Koberstein, 2005). Evidence from galamsey 
communities indicate high occurrence of lung illnesses among people who have direct or indirect 
relationship with galamsey. In Konongo and Odumase in the Ashanti Region, for instance, a 
strange lung disease killed over 100 persons. – majority being illegal miners – between 2010 and 
2013 (Alhassan, 2014). According to doctors, this mysterious lung infection (chronic obstructive 
airway) is connected to the use of mercury by those who work in galamsey mines. (Alhassan, 
2014). Uncovered pits serve as a bleeding grounds for mosquitoes too. Hence malaria is very 
common and constantly on the rise in these communities. (Castellanos, et al., 2016). 
Also, many hundreds of children work in the small-scale gold mines in risky conditions, despite 
both Ghanaian and international law frowning on child labor. Most children are aged 15 to 17, but 
younger children are fully present in illegal mines sites too. The youngest child interviewed by 
Human Rights Watch was 9 years old. (Kippenberg, 2015). One common, yet dangerous means 
of gold processing is by means of mercury. Children working with gold are often exposed to high 
levels of mercury. Mercury is known to attacks the central nervous system and can cause lifelong 
disability, including brain damage, digestive and immune systems, lungs and kidneys and even 
death (WHO, 2017). It is sad to say that the country is sacrificing its precious future as well as the 
lives of the future leaders for a terrible life now.  
Mining affected the education of children in many fronts. Too much time is being spent by most 
children working at galamsey concessions, which later results in making school attendance 
impossible (Azumah, 2018). Classroom work is hugely affected since children are almost always 
exhausted before class lessons begins in the morning. As noted, and reported by Amagyei, child 




decrease of performance they put up in the Basic Education Certificate Examination (B.E.C.E). 
He further commented on the fast-paced rising rate of school drop-out in recent years in 
communities where galamsey activities are carried out. (Amagyei, 2017). 
Again, another severely affected component of the environment by galamsey activities are 
vegetation cover, arable lands, and the ecosystem in general in Ghana (Eshun, 2017). As observed 
by Novoa, the recent growing rate of galamsey-driven deforestation is very disturbing. The nation 
has lost as much as 15,819 hectares of arable land and forest just in three years, from 2015 to 2018. 
All other species and lives residing in this depleted zone are threatened and displaced 
consequently.  (Novoa, 2020). It is reported to cost an estimated $250 million to recover lands and 
waterbodies destroyed by galamsey in Ghana’s Western region of the nation. (Nwokolo, 2019) . 
Zooming in on the effect of illegal mines on the environment, it is critical to reflect on how topsoil 
needed for agricultural production has been under threat. Heavy and modern mining equipment 
are causing a great deal of harm to the topsoil that support our agriculture production. (Agbesi, 
2017). The illegal ‘galamsey’ activities however contribute in no small measure to hunger being 
experienced in some farming communities engaged in producing cash crops such as cocoa, oil 
palm, coconut, and oranges in Ghana. (Agbesi, 2017). Since it takes several years for soil to regain 
its fertility, only time can estimate the length of the famine which has already set in galamsey 
communities when it becomes fully ripe. 
Furthermore, galamsey is also a death trap for miners and unsuspecting farmers within the mining 
communities, as they sometimes find themselves drawn to huge pits which are often left uncovered 
or unclaimed. (Eshun, 2017). Famous among the many incidences is what happened on November 
12, 2009, in Dompoase, Ashanti Region of Ghana. A collapse occurred in an illegal, privately 
owned gold mine. Up to 30 miners were prospecting the mine when it collapsed due to a landslide. 
At least 18 workers were killed in the collapse, including 14 women and the owner of the mine. 
(Wikipedia, 2011). The most recent one occurred in 26th of May 2021, where more than forty 
illegal miners were trapped in a collapsed galamsey pit in Breman, a mining community in the 
Upper Denkyira West District of the Central Region. Sources indicate that, three dead bodies have 





Furthermore, one notable export commodity Ghana produces is cocoa. Sources indicate that, 
Ghana is the world’s second largest cocoa exporter, and contributes about 20 percent of the world’s 
supply. (Abbadi, et al., 2019). More than 70 percent of cocoa beans come from West Africa from 
Ivory Coast, Ghana, Nigeria and Cameroon. pro besides, Ghana and Ivory Coast alone produce 
fifty percent of the world’s cocoa supply (Shahbandeh, 2021). Cocoa contributes enormously to 
the economy of Ghana. It closely follows mineral as the second foreign exchange earning of the 
country, supporting about four million lives in Ghana. (Shereen Abbadi, 2019). Since the record-
setting amount of cocoa production, (over one million tons in 2011), cocoa production has on a 
downward trend, with a drop to 740,000 tons in 2015. This decline rate in cocoa production in 
Ghana is attributed to increasingly increasing growth rate assumed by illegal mining activities. 
(Taylor, 2018). “Galamsey is the biggest threat to cocoa production,” Pomasi Ismael, the chairman 
of a cocoa buyers’ collective, as quoted by BloombergLaw.com. (BloombergLaw.com, 2018). 
Like a bad and never healing sore, this nuisance has been a big blow to today’s economy of Ghana, 
and it has all the features of a potential catastrophe for the future. As a result, illegal ASM operators 
are labeled as a ‘menace’, ‘threat’, ‘problem’, ‘challenge’, and ‘nuisance’ (Abdulai, 2017) whose 
presence should be ‘flushed out’ with maximum force (Hilson, 2014) The government in response 
to this has come out with a lot of dynamic policies to curtail this menace among which includes 
clamping down on galamsey concessions, easing licensing protocols and increasing surveillance 
of illegal mining activities by means of the drone technology. It is unfortunate to know that these 
policy measures have not lived up to their billing. 
1.3 Research Challenges 
Most of the activities engaged by galamsey are under the shadow since this whole sector is deemed 
illegal. Hence, there is not enough concrete data about their activities. For example, many people 
engaged in this act do not want to speak up or give any sort of information due to security reasons. 
The second challenge has to do with my inability to travel to galamsey sites and communities for 
collecting primary data for this study due to corona travel restrictions. So I depended largely on 





1.4 Research Objectives and Research Questions 
The objective for this research is to find out why illegal gold mining in Ghana continues to flourish 
and how can this menace be regularized. To achieve this objective, the following questions would 
be answered. 
b. Why does the illegal mining sector continue to flourish despite the government’s 
intervention policies?  
c. Which robust policy can formalize the Artisanal Small-Scale Mining sector? 
d. How does formalization of the sector help to reduce the environmental challenges 
associated with the illegal mining sector? 
1.5 Data Collection 
Due to travelling restrictions as a result of corona virus pandemic, the researcher could not take a 
trip for primary data collection. Hence, the study was primarily conducted with data from 
published research database (newspaper reports, written interviews and expert knowledge of key 
participants in the system and also from numerical data the written). Where data seemed 
conflicting, the researcher called to personnel in Ghana who are noted to have insight in the illegal 
mining operations for clarity. 
1.6 Research Methodology 
With the above research questions and objectives in mind, a research method that comes handy is 
System dynamic. System Dynamics is a perspective and a set of conceptualize tools that enables 
us to understand the structure and dynamics of complex systems. It is also a rigorous modelling 
modeling method that enables us to build formal computer simulations of complex systems and use 
them to design more effective policies and organizations. (Sterman, 2000). The approach 
commences with identifying and defining a dynamic problem, hypothesizing and analyzing the 
problem, followed by modeling stages, to building confidence in the model and its proposed 
policy(s). (SDS, 2021). System dynamic method of problem-solving focuses on using available 
information and realistic data to build a quantitative model capable of typically referencing the 




policy strategy or update existing ones. Dynamic theoretical framework is the foundation of the 
system dynamic modelling method. This means that connections involved are built on causality, 
feedback systems and delay structures, model boundaries, and a unit of time (Deckers, 2017). The 
conceptual framework is based on data collected from literature, interviews, and observations. 
According to Turner, system dynamic modeling is a distinctive approach for probing into the 
challenges associated with natural resources due to their inherent complicated behavior is system 
dynamics modelling technique. ( Turner, et al., 2016). 
1.7 Research Ethics 
A great deal of integrity was employed for the construction of model and analyzing it. The 
modelling process fully adheres to the standard set by the system dynamic society. Though this 
thesis was conducted primarily on secondary data, quotes and references used were given the 
needed ethical consideration they deserve. Insights and conclusions derived from this study are 















CHAPTER TWO HYPOTHESIS 
2.1 THEOROTICAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1.1 What Is Tragedy of The Commons? 
The tragedy of the commons is an economic dilemma in which every person has a good reason to 
have a fair share of a resource, but at the expense of every other individual -- with no way to 
prevent anyone from consuming. (Boyle, 2020). This tragedy is usually associated with common 
pool resources. Common-pool resources as defined by Ostrom is characterized by complexity of 
prohibition and create limited amounts of resource units so that one person’s use take away from 
the remaining amount of the resource others can obtain. (Ostrom, 1999). Examples of common 
resources include irrigation systems, fishing grounds, pastures, forests, water or the atmosphere, 
and other mineral resources like gold, diamond and bauxite. 
Sustainable management of a non-renewable natural resources has been a vastly disputed subject 
among researchers and policy makers, including governments and ordinary citizens alike (Hardin, 
1968). Our quest to effectively manage minerals from getting into extinction or from being 
abusively used has led to a wide range of managerial strategies. Prominent among these strategies 
include privatization (Sethi & Somanathan, 1996), government control (Sethi & Somanathan, 
1996) and self-organized regimes – when resources are self-regulated by indigenous users 
(Ostrom, 1999).  
Self-organize management strategies have shown themselves to be broadly successful while the 
other two forms of managerial strategies, government control and privatization, have failed in 
some instances (Isaza, 2013). 
In his publication, “State Policy and Pasture Degradation in Inner Asia”, Sneath (Sneath, 1998) 
contrasted the efficacy of self-organized group-property regime and central government 
management based on the results of these two management strategies of grassland management in 
China, Mongolia and Russia. It became evident from the results that, the resources managed by 
government (China and Russia) shows more degradation compared to that managed by group-




Both China and Russia on their part adapted state-owned approach whereas Mongolia adopted 
Agricultural-cooperatives approach in which the indigenous people mutually engage in farming 
operations as a group. By restructuring the managerial style, China in recent times has adopted 
privatization by giving portion of the agricultural land to individuals. Eventual results indicated 
that, whilst only one-tenth of the Mongolian pastureland got degraded, only about a quarter of the 
Russian pastural land remained. Also, less than three-quarters of the Chinese section has survived 
degraded. The lax in both privatization and government-controlled management strategies are 
exposed in here.   
Superiority of the Self-Organized regime is also obvious in the South Indian’s irrigation system 
study conducted by Bardhan. (Bardhan, 1999). He studied about quality of irrigation systems 
managed separately by both by the government and the locals. Results of his study revealed that, 
overall well-being of canals managed by the government is considerably lower compared to the 
one the farmers themselves. He also reported that, among the 480 farmers interviewed, the farmers 
were more compliant to rules governing the use of the irrigation system when they took part in 
formulating those laws as opposed to when the law was imposed on them by a higher authority. 
Another key highlight of his study was that, among the communities considered, there was 
frequent violation of rules where government agency decides the laws and farmers contribution to 
the local village fund was very little. 
In a study entitled ‘An institutional approach to the study of forest resources’ Poteete and Ostrom 
came to a conclusion that is consistent with Bardhan’s study. (Poteete & Ostrom, 2002). In the 
study an assessment was made between the kinds of organizational strategies involved in forest 
management. They concluded from their research that when indigenous people, who have the 
mandate to formulate regulations, have adequate knowledge about the state of a resource (forest 
in their case and any other common pool resource), and perceive a potential sustainable profit to 
overshadow the perceived cost for maintenance, there is a higher chance of forming effective 
mechanisms to take care of the resource in a more sustainable way. 
These examples contribute to the believe that local common pool resource users are capable of 
effectively managing the resources they depend on if they are given the chance to formulate 




2.1.2 Threats to Self-Organized Regimes 
However, self-organized regimes, just as any other managerial strategies, are not without setbacks.  
With mutual trust (a key foundation of self-organized regimes) under threat due to rapid 
settlements, this system of management will sooner or later get dissolved in areas where migration 
rate is high. (Baland & Platteau, 1996). 
Another threat has to with the government’s quest to enforce or ensure uniformity of rules on all 
sectors in the country. When it so happens, it may be difficult for the government to exclude the 
governing of common pool resources in her unified scheme of governance. This will mean that the 
self-organized approach to the resource management has to change and may consequently lead to 
the collapse of the regime. 
Mode and principles of procedure can be challenged when in transition within generations. With 
the rapid change of technology which proportionally affects the way we do things it is possible 
that the agreed principles of governance accepted by one generation may be derided by another. 
4) turning to external sources of help too frequently.  
international aid that does not take account of indigenous knowledge and institutions. 
Again, upsurge in dishonesty and other forms of devious conduct is another threat to this system 
of management. When members or appropriators at a point in time tend to maximize their own 
economic self-interest at the expense of the other partners, the entire system will suffer. 
Despite these challenges, Ostrom still expresses her confidence in self-organize regimes by placing 
emphasis on learning from success stories of the past achievers. She also advocates for a high level 
of effective communication, information and trust that are comprehensive and deep beyond the 
norm, but not beyond what is rational.  There is much to learn from successful efforts as well as 






2.1.3 Why Is Gold Mining Considered a Tragedy of The Commons? 
Gold is a highly sought-after and highly regarded precious metal. It is indispensable due to its 
natural marvelous luster and radiant glistening appearance. Is it a prime commodity for the jewel 
industries, finances and investing enterprises, sporting associations, electronics and computer 
companies, dentistry and medicine as well as aerospace. (Sepanek, 2012). But it is also a limited 
resource, and there will sooner or later come a time when there would be none available to be 
extracted. (Harper, 2020). Its finite volume (limited resource), and the fact that it could likely be 
found anywhere and accessed by anyone makes it fall into the domain of common pool resource. 
(Rassios, 2019). 
By drawing on the works of Ostrom, Adams  ( Adams, et al., 2001) has the following to say about 
the key characteristics of a common pool resource. 
1. the physical exclusion of potential users from common pool resources is difficult. 
2. their consumption is rivalrous or subtractable; that is, increased consumption by one agent 
implies that less is available for others.  
Gold extraction could strongly be aligned to these characteristics. As elaborated at the problem 
identification section of this paper, illegal mining activities have caused a loss of billions of dollars 
in revenue due to tax invasion (Leudi, 2019) to Ghana. It has also accelerated the depletion of 
agricultural lands and forest reserves (Agbesi, 2017), causing a growing concern about food 
security in communities where mining takes place (ACET, 2017), partly because of reduced food 
production (Alhassan, 2014) and also usage of farmlands for mining activities (Eriksen, 2014). Its 
implication continues to raise an ugly head on the water, health, forest reserves, aquatic life, pupil’s 
school attendance, child labor concerns, and a host of others social vices (Eshun, 2018). 
Apparently, these effects of illegal gold mining activities which engulfs everyone else, especially 
the many innocent ones, clearly make it an undeniable candidate of tragedy of the commons 
(Hardin, 1968).  
Accordingly, when miners in the illegal gold mining business ignore the outcome their actions 




Thus, the price (negative effect of the greedy few) of illegal mining activities are apportioned to 
everyone. 
The possibility of a common pool resource to be governed by a self-regime management depends 
on certain characteristics. Describing these characteristics in her study “Revisiting the Commons: 
Local Lessons, Global Challenges”, Elinor Ostrom’s (1999) speculation includes the following, 
1. Possible Improvement: that is, there is clear evidence to believe that the resource conditions are 
not at a point of deterioration such that it is unprofitable or a waste of time to manage the resource.  
2. Indicators: that is, there is a dependable statistic of the state of the resource that could be fetched 
or assessed at a reasonably low cost. 
3. When there is a consistent way of forecasting the flow of the resource. 
4. Geographical scope of the resource is another indicator. This allows users to generally develop 
precise knowledge of elements that exist within (inside or outside) their domain. 
To a larger extend, gold minerals have all the above characteristics. Hence, it is safe to say that it 
qualifies for the self-organized management style. Appropriately, the above indicators address the 
shape and scope of gold deposit in Ghana. There is still enough deposit of gold minerals available. 
According to ghanatrade.org (2020), gold still remains the major exported commodity of Ghana. 
Due to its wide availability, finite volume and its open access nature, gold resource/deposits in 
Ghana could fittingly be described as a common pool resource and can equally be formalized by 
means of a self-organized regime. For a sustainable and win-win condition (between government 
and locals), small scale mining activities in Ghana should be governed by the locals and monitored 








2.1.4 Why Is Ghana Experiencing This Tragedy?  
Scaling up how tragic the small-scale mining sector in Ghana has become, it has been obvious that 
Hardin’s ideology (Hardin, 1968) of resource management that encourages central government to 
take control of all common-pool resources is only next to failure in Ghana. 
Over the years, the government has tried varied policies for formulizing this sector but with little 
to no positive impact. In the publication entitled ‘The Rise of the Fourth Estate: The Media, 
Environmental Policy, and the Fight against Illegal Mining in Ghana’ Kpienbaareh declares the 
following interventions as already employed by the government of Ghana; the establishment of a 
Galamsey court, demarcation of land plots suitable for Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining 
activities, provision of alternative livelihoods for those engaged in galamsey and galamsey 
communities, and decentralization of the Artisanal Small-Scale Mining (ASM) licensing regime 
among others. (Kpienbaareh, et al., 2020). But yet the big question still remains, is galamsey 
menace in Ghana a policy impasse? (Liege, 2021).  
The reality is, government-controlled strategy and interventions have done very little to address 
the challenges at hand. It is safe to say that the solution to this menace does not absolutely lie in 
the hands of the government. In other words, the government-controlled approach of management 
does not provide the remedy to the pervasive illegalities confronting the small-scale mining sector, 
especially in Ghana where government officials are claimed to be involved in this exploitation 
(Eshun, 2018). 
But is this menace bedeviling the sector really inescapable? Ghana is locked up in this situation 
hugely due its managerial strategy in action.  Without including the resource users in formulating 
policies to govern this sector will continue to pose this challenge. A new system of governance is 
obviously necessary, and Self-organized managerial strategy is recommended, due to its vast 
success story for managing similar commons in other locations. (Ostrom, 1999). 
Illegal mining has always been a concern but the astronomical rise in the number of galamsey 
mines in Ghana is traceable to rise in gold price in world marked in 2008. ( Botchwey & Crawford, 
2019). This hike in gold price enticed many investors, both local and foreigners alike, to suffocate 




officials coupled with profitability of the gold resource escalated the rise in the number of investors 
consequently soaring the number of mines. ( Botchwey, et al., 2018). The high level of 
mechanization and up-to-date technology introduced onto the various mining sites resulted in huge 






















3. CHAPTER THREE MODEL DESCRIPTION 
3.1 PROBLEM DESCRIPTION & MODEL DESCRIPTION 
3.1.1 Introduction and Model Overview 
This model represents the mining industry in Ghana. The stock and flow diagram are the system 
dynamic approach to conceptualizing the realities pertaining to the illegal mining industry in 
Ghana. For the purpose of clarity, the model is grouped into four sectors: The Mining Sector, The 
Gold Reserves Sector, The Environment Sector and The Mining Benefit Sector. These sectors 
serve as the scope and boundary of this study. Each individual sector captures a specific reality of 
the mining industry that worth looking into in order to fully comprehend the dynamic behavior 
associated with the industry. This serves as the foundation of any justifications and insights this 











3.1.2 The Mining Sector 
 
Figure 2 - Mining Sector 
 
This part of the model captures the mining sector. The mining sector represents the main sector of 
the model. It describes the interaction between the number of mines and the profit nature of the 
business. The rise in number of mines is shaped by the profitability nature of the industry. 
Unrestrained increase in revenue and income owing to the steady increase in price of gold is 
internalized due to the lack of tax or similar regulation that confront the income of miners. With 
this reality at hand, a high relative return on investment is observed which influences the number 
of new investors that stream into the industry every year. The mechanism is self-reinforcing, 






3.1.2A Profit Reinforcing Loop 
 
Figure 3 Reinforcing Loop one 
This is the main and dominant loop of the sector. As discussed above, increase in number of mines 
proportionally increases the amount of money resulting from total revenue. With increased amount 
in revenue, and with no tax impeding the revenue growth, a high level of return on investment is 
realized. With open-secret knowledge about the high return on investment, a number of new 
investors are lured into the venture consequently. This influences the growth in the number on 






3.1.2B Capital Balancing Loop 
 
Figure 4 Capital Balancing Loop 
The other balancing loop that provides a measure of impediment to the steady growth in the 
number of mines in this sector is the capital. When the number of mines increases, large capital is 
required to operate the sector. With any increase in the amount required as capital, the actual return 
on investment is reduced. This serves as a disincentive to potential investment affecting marginally 








3.1.2C Expenses Balancing Loop 
 
However, there is a limiting factor which slightly slows down the growth of the number of mines 
in the industry. This comes partly in the form of the expenses. Increasing in number of mines 
indicates that operating expenses is increased. With increased operating and other expenses, the 
level of income is reduced. This affects the return on investment and proportionally affects the 
number of new mines formed the following year. The mechanism is a self-balancing one 
accounting for why the illegal mines do not grow relentlessly. 
3.1.2D Interacting Loops of Mining Sector 
As discussed above, the mining sector is comprised of the four loops above: two balancing loops 
and two reinforcing loops. The balancing loops provide only a minute measure of restraint to the 
increasing drive of the number of mines. However, the reinforcing loops remain the dominant loop 




for this sector accounting for the reason why the number of illegal mines keeps soaring. The main 
reinforcing loop comprising of mines – total revenue – income before tax – return on investment 
– indicated mines and mines is the strongest reinforcing dominating the sector. However, the other 
reinforcing loop comprising of the mines and the indicated mines also a reasonable degree of 
influence on the sector. 
 





















Figure 7 Gold Reserve Sector 
 
This sector describes the relationship between the gold reserve remaining and the capital required 
to start up a mining business. This sector consists of the ‘Accumulated gold produced’ stock, with 
its flow of ‘Mining’. ‘Average gold mined by large mines per year’, ‘total gold mined by mines 
per year’, ‘tons per mine’ and ‘effect of depleting gold on cost of mining’ are the variables making 
up this sector. 
Tons per mines represents the total volume of gold (in tons) produced by each mine company 
annually. The ‘total gold mined by mines per year’ is a product of ‘tons per mine’ and the ‘number 
of mines’. This therefore describes the total volume (in tons) of gold produced by the small-scale 




of gold that the large mines in Ghana produce yearly. Therefore, what is produced by the large 
mines together with what is produced by the small-scale mines constitute the total gold produced 
or mined in Ghana on a yearly basis. The two together make up the variable named ‘Mining’. The 
total amount of gold mined each year by both large-scale and small-scale mines accumulates in 
the Accumulate gold produced stock. The more gold the two types of mines produce each year, 
the more the volume of the accumulated gold produced. The more the accumulated gold produced, 
the lesser the remaining gold reserve in Ghana becomes since the total volume of gold in Ghana is 











Figure 8 Gold Production Effect 
As indicated by the causal loop diagram above, with less gold reserves remaining, it becomes 
increasingly difficult to mine a new gold, which means that the cost of gold mining sees a steady 
increase. With increasing cost in mining, the rate of mining consequently decreases. This describes 






3.1.4 The Environmental Effect Sector 
 
Figure 9 Environmental Effect Sector 
 
This sector represents the relationship between the illegal mining activities and the environment. 
Mining activities inadvertently impacts the landscape and ecology of the environment within 
which they are situated. The mechanism involving the creation of new mines, its effect on the 
environment and how much it costs to reinstate the degraded land are what this sector 
demonstrates.  
Noteworthy elements in this sector include new land used in mining, forest and farmland, forest 
depletion, cost of afforestation, land reclamation cost per hectare, cost of reclaiming unusable land, 
Unusable land, afforestation and time to recover naturally. 
The forest and farmland stock represents the total land mass, including water bodies, where mining 




mining) is created. The new land mine, due to its degradation, then become unusable land because 
it is neither good for farming nor any other productive course. The process by which creation of 
new mine turns a forest land into an unusable land is described by the forest depletion flow. 
When no active afforestation intervention is carried out, the unusable land on itself will begin to 
regrow into forest land after a number of years. This process is called ‘afforestation’ and the 
estimated number of years of regrowth is termed as ‘time to recover naturally’ in this sector. 
It is important to note that, the unusable land degraded by the galamseyers will be abandoned, 
awaiting the government to reclaim or regrow the land. This is because the miners are mining 
under the watch of the law and hence, they are not held accountable for the mess they cause. The 
extent of mess done to the environment, in monetary terms, is dependent on how much it cost to 
reclaim one hectare of land and the chunk of hectares degraded. This is activity is described by the 
variables land reclamation cost per hectare and cost of reclaiming unusable land. 
 














This sector shows the financial statistics and implications by the illegal mining business on the 
economy of Ghana. It describes how the respective (wages, tax for the government, income for the 
miners, as well as the cost of mining on the environment) disciplines build up or accumulate 
throughout the period under discussion. It describes how much money is obtained by the miners, 
the government, the workers on a yearly basis and how they accumulate into huge sums of money 
eventually. It also highlights the environmental implications in monetary terms by this illegal 
activity. 
It finally talks about the net benefit of the mining activity. Net benefit represents the overall 
financial gains from the sector taking into account both the positives and the negatives aspects. 
3.2 Model Interlacing Causal Loop Diagram 
 
Figure 11- The Entire Sector's CLD 
The figure above presents a general overview of how the elements within the illegal mining 




activities. When a mining business is established, capital is needed to fund it. So the more the 
number of mines, the more the funding capital required. With increased capital, the return on 
investment on capital is reduced which slightly decreases the establishment of new mines the 
following year. This is represented by the loop B-1.  
Also, the more the number of mines, the more mining activities are carried out. This increases the 
amount of gold produced or dug. With more gold dug, it will require more capital (in the form of 
sophisticated mining equipment and new technologies) to mine the next tons of gold. This 
increases the cost of capital per mine and ultimately the entire capital invested in the mining 
business. When capital for mining is high, new investors are deterred from investing in the mining 
business the following year. This partially inhibits the growth of the mining sector. This is 
represented by the loop B-2. 
Another growth inhibiting element of the sector comes in the form of expenses. Excessive 
expenses somewhat deter new investor from joining the pool of illegal miners. This is what is 
demonstrated by the loop B-3. With increases in number of mines, much is required to take care 
of the operating and other expenses the business incurs. This affects the income level of miners. 
With reduced income level, return on investment is also reduced making mining less attractive to 
onlookers or potential investors. 
However, entire sector is driven by how much revenue is made each year by the mines. As the 
number of mines grow, the amount of revenue realized is proportionally increased. With no tax or 
resource rent paid by the miners, their income level increases, maximizing the return on the 
investment they make. With high return on investment, a lot more investors are enticed into the 
mining business the following year. When this happens, more new mines are formed each year 
increasing dramatically the total number of mines in existence. This is a self-reinforcing one and 
it is represented by the loop R-2. 
It is noteworthy of mentioning that, when new mine is formed, farm or forest land suffers. When 
this happens, forest and farmland depletion is accelerated. This explains why depletion of forest 
reserves and farmlands in Ghana has been on ascendancy. Much money is required for land 




It is a simple formulation that matches mines to indicated mines over the mine start delay time of 
two years. The number mines are expected to grow to the level of the indicated new mines every 
two years. This is represented by loop R-1. 
 
3. 3 Parameter Validation 
Parameter Value Unit Description Source 
Relative ROI 0.1 1/Year this refers to the percentage of 
the total amount invested that an 
investor would need to earn each 
year in profit to make it a 
worthwhile investment 
Assumption 
Time to expand 2 Years This accounts for the time taken 
for investor to fully get a mine 
site operational 
 (Leudi, 2019) 
Land reclamation cost per 
hectare 
11000 USD/Year this refers to the amount of 
money required to reclaim one 
hectare of degraded land. It is 
estimated at $1100, a figure 
gotten from s researched source. 
 (GhanaWeb, 
2017) 
Base capital per mine 8000 USD/Year the refers to the base capital per 
mine at the beginning of the 
simulation 
Assumption 
Mine lifespan 3 Years This represents the average 
lifespan of a mine when it is 
mined illegally. The average 
mine of a galamsey mine 
 (Leudi, 2019) 
Average lifetime 
of capital 
20 Years this refers to the average time it 
takes for machines, money and 




other equipment invested 
initially into the mines to become 
no more usable. 
 Dealing fee fraction 20 Dmnl this represents gold transaction 
cost. This refers to the fraction of 
the revenue lost when miners sell 
gold to dealers or middlemen 
(Lawson, 2015) 
Tons per mine per 
year of mining 
0.00117 tons/mine/year this refers to the volume of Tons 
of gold produced by each mine 





3.4 Time Horizon 
The duration or period of time within which the model is calibrated from 2004 until 2070. The 
reason for this choice is as follows. 
1. 2004 because that is when a reliable data for reference mode is reliably available. 2004 is 
reasonable since it allows for the build-up of a meaningful reference mode without any 
hinderance to insights the model can give. 
2. 2070 is a reasonable ending point since it allows enough time for the full projected course 
of the mining industry under the scenarios tested in this model.  
3.5 Level of Aggregation 
This model is about the small-scale mining sector in Ghana. It zooms in on illegal aspect of the 
small-scale mines specifically. It does not compare illegal small-scale mines to large mines, 
neither does it compare the illegal mining business in Ghana to a similar business in another 
country. However, the insights and conclusions from the model can be applied to similar illegal 




3.6 Model Boundary 
The model focuses on the illegal small-scale mining sector and how capital for setting up a new 
mine is affected by how much gold reserves is available. Again, it shows the stress illegal mines 
causes to the environment within which it is situated as well as everyone else living around the 
mining communities. It also focuses on the financial burden it leaves on the shoulders of the 
government, when mined pits or sites are abandoned upon their depletion of forest. It further 
reflects on the benefit of the sector in terms of the amount of money paid as wages to those 
employed by the sector. 
3.7 Integration Method And DT 
The integration method used for this model is Euler’s method of integration. The DT is the default 
DT of 1/32. The model is sensitive to a DT value of ¼. Smaller DTs are however not sensitive to 
the model behavior. 
3.8 Model Validation 
To establish the validity of this model, the following wide variety of tests are carried out. 
3.8.1 Boundary Adequacy 
The model has a well-defined boundary. The essential concepts for tackling the galamsey crisis 
under the considered boundary are well represented in the model. The problem on hand affects the 
mining sector of the nation, the financial aspects in terms of tax invasion, the environment 
degradation harming the farm, water bodies and forest reserves. All these aspects are captured by 
the model. 
3.8.2 Structure Assessment  
As described in the introduction section and the model description section of this paper, the model 
was developed according to the real world information about the illegal mining business in Ghana. 
Based on Forrester and Senge’s (Forrester & Senge, 1980) structural assessment validity 





3.8.3 Dimensional Consistency 
All parameters have real world meaning and use equations with coherent dimensions. 
Additionally, there are no unreasonable variables added to the model forcing dimensional 
consistency. 
3.8.4 Parameter Assessment  
Parameters chosen for this model are reasonable and fall within the parameter boundaries of the 
real world system. They were gathered from the pool of experts’ studies and other related credible 
sources, and some were assumed due to the research challenges that confronted data gathering, as 
discussed in the research challenges part of this study. Estimated parameters as a matter of clarity 
do not substantially stray from the ideal world values, however, some of these variables seem to 
be very sensitive as really needing further testing and validation to give the model further 
credibility. The assumed variables include effect of depleting gold on cost of mining, effect of 
relative profit, dealing fee fraction, tons per mine per year, relative ROI, and time to expand. 
3.8.5 Extreme Condition 
With extreme conditions, we talk about equations which orchestrates the behavior the model 
produces. It specifically talks about how vigorous these equations are especially under extreme 
circumstances. By and large, each equation formulated in this model has been exposed to 
extreme conditions by using variety of modelling formulae. Where necessary, a MIN function is 
used to avoid the equations to take unwarranted figures. 
3.8.6 Integration Error 
There is no integration error in the model since the model is not sensitive to time step or 
numerical integration method. Euler integration method is used and a default dt of 1/32 was 
chosen. Change in dt below this does not affect the results the model produces. 
3.8.7 Behavior Reproduction 
Behavior reproduction focuses on how chiefly the model mimics the behavior of the reference 




is represents. In other words, the model largely replicates the behavior that the illegal mining has 
shown until 2018. 
 
 
Figure 12 represents the behavior assessment of the model in relation to the reference mode. The 
blue color (Number of galamsey) is the actual behavior the mining sector in Ghana shows. The red 
dash line (Mines) also represents the behavior the model produces. As seen by the two lines, the 
red one mimics the behavior of the blue one. This indicates the validity of the behavior assessment 
of the model. 
3.8.9 Family Member 
Due to the fact that the theoretical framework upon which the model is build is applicable to 
other settings experiencing similar challenges, the model could generally be useful for similar 
challenges experienced in other settings. 
 






3.8.10 Surprise Behavior 
The model does not produce any surprise behavior or make known any previously unobserved 
behavior. Rather, it successfully predicts a novel approach to solving the illegal mining at hand. 
That is, by using tax to regulate the sector when policy switch is activated. 
3.8.11 System Improvement 
By means of the model, the mining sector in Ghana has received a win-win approach (between 
miners and government) of regularizing the business. With the suggested policy, the 
environmental challenges associated with this sector would be largely resolved. Moreover, 
















4.0 CHAPTER FOUR – ANALYSIS 
4.1 Introduction 
The focus of this chapter is to analyze the behavior of the model and its striking reflections on 
the real world’s scenarios. Simulation is constructed from parameters based on actual data about 
illegal mining activities. It describes the happenings in the sector based on the usual pattern of 
how business is conducted by the illegal miners. It zooms in specifically on how the growth of 
number of mines affects the revenue, farm and forest lands as well as the amount of money the 
government will need to restore degraded abandoned mine sites. The scenarios discussed in the 
section are the base case scenarios without the intervention of the proposed policy for the mining 
sector. 
4.1.1 SCENARIO ONE: ILLEGAL MINING BUSINESS AS USUAL UNTIL 2018. 
    
 
   
Figure 14 Miners Income in 2018 Figure 13 Mines in 2018 




The figures above show the steady growth in the number of mines in the illegal mining business 
in Ghana since 2004 - the starting point of this simulation - to 2018. Figure 14 represents the 
number of mines. It shows an increasing growth rate until around 2013 where it slows down 
momentarily. The slowing down of growth is due to the crackdown intervention employed by the 
government of Ghana in that year. A measure of policy success was seen until about 2015 where 
illegal mining became fully active again and the increasing growth rate resurfaces until 2018. This 
is what the graph portrays. 
The next figure (figure 15) shows the benefits the sector accrues. It is obvious that the accumulated 
income after tax freely mimics the behavior of the growth of number of mines without any 
interruption. This indicates how beneficial the illegal mining business is as it grows. This is partly 
because of absence of tax or any other resource rent payment. The whole business is of course 
under the shadow of illegalities. At the end of the year 2018, the sector is enriched with some about 
6 billion USD due to its free ride (no tax) nature.  
The miners are enriching themselves at the expense of everyone else. This explains why the 
accumulated tax income is 0 USD throughout the year under consideration. A little wonder why 
the government has been trying out several conditions including cracking down to halt the 
operations of these illegal miners. The accumulated environmental cost however increases so long 
as there is an active mine in place. This indicates how the country is losing out on this illegal 
business. The cost for restoring the environment is left on the shoulders of the country to carry that 
burden. 
Figure 16 zooms in on the benefit the sector provides. The so called benefit is even realized after 
2011. This is evident by the net benefit line (blue) transiting from negative to positive value. It is 
so-called-benefit because the government is still left with debt and does not share in the income 
internalized by the sector. The net benefit still hitting below positive values is an indication of the 
incalculable revenue and environmental loss due to this illegal business in the mining sector. The 
situation is what it is hugely due to the absence of tax as depicted by the red line which remains at 
zero throughout the period under review. However, the government does benefit in the sense that, 
local people are employed which lifts part of the burden of mass employment she must carry. The 




farmland and forest reserves. A closer look at this graph reveals the striking similarity between the 
identity of its behavior and that of the growth of mines. It is safe to say that growth of illegal mines 
is parallel to the growth of forest degradation which remains as a sole burden of the nation. By 
2018, there is about 500K hectares of land greedily consumed by the illegal mining sector as 
depicted by the graph of figure 17. 
 
4.1.2 SCENARIO TWO: BUSINESS AS USUAL UNTIL 2021 (TODAY) 
This part of the chapter focuses on the present situation of the illegal mining business in Ghana 








Figure 17 Mines Benefit in 2021 Figure 18 Mines in 2021. 




Mine’s characteristics in 2021 follow the pattern it has assumed all the while. The upward 
trajectory of the number of mines is still experienced in 2021, just as in 218. Interestingly, the rate 
of growth of the number is increasing at a faster tempo more than before. The same speed in growth 
of number of mines is assumed by the miners’ income graph which is also increasing more swiftly. 
This tells how beneficial the business is to the miners. It is again worthy of mention that, this 
unbridled growth in number of mines and miners’ income for that matter is due to the absence of 
tax collection. This is indicated by the accumulated tax income being zero during the period under 
discussion. With no tax in place, the net benefit (depicted by the mines benefit graph) also mimics 
the behavior of the miner’s income. The reason being that, when the number of mines grow, the 
miners’ income grows proportionally, which increases the net benefit at the same rate due to 
absence of tax collection. 
So, with about 50,000 mines in place in 2021, a projected income of about 20 billion USD is being 
raked in by the miners with about 17 billion USD net profit internalized. But what makes matters 
worse is the fact that the main drivers of this illegal business are foreigners who take away all 
benefits accrued from this venture away from the shores of Ghana. Meanwhile as depicted by the 
environmental cost figure, about 2.8 billion USD damage done to the environment is deserted.  










   
 
To begin with, the figure 22 which represents cost of producing a ton of gold shows an interesting 
behavior with the huge spike that shows up between 2013 and 2015. This was due to the crackdown 
policy employed by the government within those years. The crackdown made it extremely difficult 
to mine a ton of gold due to the high risk involved in operations then. This resulted in a drop in the 
number of mines within the crackdown period. But this policy was resisted, and mining operations 
resumed as usual from 2015 onwards.  
The growth of number of mines is proportional to the volume of gold produced by the sector. With 
increased accumulated gold production, much more capital is required to stay in operation due to 
scarcity or limited reserve of gold deposits. Initially, the rise in cost of gold has only a marginal 
impact on the rising number of mines since the return on investment was still overwhelmingly 
profitable. But with the cost of production becoming a bit more expensive (about 7 million USD 
per ton) beginning 2024, there is an evident decrease in the rising number of mines. This is what 
is depicted by each of the graphs above from 2021 until around 2028. 






With the cost of gold production still increasing after 2028, the number of mines begins to see a 
decline since the capital involved in setting up a gold mine is on the high. This in turn affects the 
accumulated income after tax and consequently the net benefit internalized by the sector. So as 
indicated by the two graphs just above, the rate of growth of the accumulated income after tax as 
well as the net profit generated by the sector starts to grow slowly after the year 2028. 
However, it is quite disturbing to see how the environmental cost keeps accumulating despite the 
decrease in the growth rate of the number of mines. This is because, irrespective of the decrease 
in growth rate of the number of mines, the remaining number of mines keeps causing harm to the 


























Well, the cost for producing a ton of gold will continue to rise after 2030 but in a decreasing 
manner. This is because, the increasing rate of gold accumulation is slowed down due to the 
decreasingly decreasing growth rate of the number of mines. The consequence of this is reflected 
by the figure above which shows the number of mines. 
However, beginning around 2034, the number of mines starts to reduce at a decreasing speed. This 
is due to the fact that, mining activities are reduced (due to less mines remaining) which has 
reduced the increasing rate of gold accumulation. Hence, irrespective of the fact that cost of gold 
production continues to increase, it rather increases in a decreasing rate this time. This slows down 
the rate at which the number of mines reduce at an increasing speed. So as shown by the graphs 
Figure 28 Cost of Producing a ton of gold by 2070. Figure 29 Cost of Managing a Mine by 2070 




                                             
above, the accumulated gold produced will thereafter slow down the speed of growth, slowing 
down the growth rate of capital required to start a new mine or stay in operation. With this situation 
the at hand, the decline rate of the number of mines will continue to decrease decreasingly until 
the collapse of entire business around the year of 2070. 
With the number  of mines seeing a sharp decline from 2028, the accumulated income after tax 
begin to slow down in its growth. This is because despite the reduced number of mines, the 
remaining mines continue to realize a measure of income in their operations. But more and more 
mines continue to fall out of operation dwindling the speedy growth rate of the accumulated 
income after tax. By 2036 when the declining rate of the number of mines is intensified, the 
accumulated income after tax grows more slowly. This is because the intensive decline rate in 
mines is proportional to intensified loss of income, hence the income volume (in the shape of 
accumulated income after tax) increases more swiftly. 
Net benefit also responds proportionally to the growth rate of the number of mines. As number of 
mines started to grow decreasingly in 2028, the increasingly increasing growth rate of the net 
benefit begins to slow down until 2036.  With less mines continuing to remain, less and less income 
is realized each year. This is why the accumulated income after tax grows decreasingly. 
Interestlingly, the environmental cost continues to grow more aggressively until 2036 when the it 
begins to slow down in its growth due to the sharp decline in the number of mines. Less mines 
remaining means less environmental cost is internalized, resulting in its decreased growth rate. As 
number of mines declines more sharply, the environmental cost grows more slowly. 




But with enivronmental cost still active and the accumulated income after tax almost stagnated at 
2040, the net benefit begins to see a measure of decrease from that year on.  
4.2 DISCUSSION OF ANALYSIS 
The uncomfortable reality is, at the point of the mines collapsing, the following scenarios are 
likely to happen. 
1. The whopping majority of the income gotten from mines is taken away from the shores of 
the country since the mains drivers in this illegal business are foreigners. 
2. Farmers might have given their farmland for galamsey concessions and hence they do not 
have any more farms to return to after the collapse of the mining industry. Unemployment 
and hunger will in mining communities and the nation at large will intensify. 
3. Extreme loss of revenue to the state since the foreigner will carry along the income accrued 
from the illegal business out of the shores of Ghana. Even if 70% of accumulated income 
is used in wages for workers, a lot of money is set to leave the country. 
4. Incalculable environmental problem. The many farmlands and forest reserves depleted are 
abandoned to be reclaimed by the nation at the expense of GDP generated. Losing this life-
changing mineral in exchange of abandoned degraded farmlands and forest reserves really 
calls for an urgent measures and interventions. For this reason, this study proposes a policy 











5.0 CHAPTER FIVE: POLICY 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
On this chapter, the study focuses on the behavior the mining sector will assume when it is 
formalized. It describes the happenings in the sector based on the usual pattern of how business is 
conducted by the illegal miners but with regulations agreed upon by both the government and the 
miners. It zooms in explicitly on how the proposed policy will affect growth of number of mines,  
the revenue, farm and forest lands, as well as the amount of money the government will need to 
restore degraded abandoned mine sites.  
The suggested policy for the illegal mining business in Ghana is tax. Introduction of tax has the 
potential to replace more adequately the crackdown policy the government implemented. Different 
tax rates produce uniquely interesting income margins for both the government and the miners. 
Each rate certainly creates win-win results between the government and the miners, giving this 
policy a competitive superiority over the crackdown. 
When the policy is activated in 2021 the following scenarios are triggered. 
1. Mines’ lifespan is moved from 3 to 10 year. Ideally, a small-scale legal mine has an average 
of ten years lifespan. The hit and run approach assumed by the illegal miners is the reason 
why the average mines lifespan is reduced to three years. 
2. Amount of gold mined per mine per year increases. The more they stay on a piece of land 
mining for gold, the better they are able to fully exhaust gold deposits on that piece of land. 
This will proportionally increase the volume of gold produced since more time is dedicated 
to mining. 
3. Burden of the environment is shifted to the miners. The policy ensures that, miners have a 
detailed plan for restoring the environment after the mining operation is expired. This will 
ensure that, the miners themselves will reclaim the degraded land (as part of their expenses) 
4. Afforestation is actively carried out in 10 years rather than waiting for the forest to be 









When policy is activated in 2021, the burden of the environmental cost is shifted from the 
government to the miners to care for. So throughout the entire lifespan of the mining sector, the 
government has no worries about the environment cost except the backlog before the policy was 
implemented.  






Besides, whenever the policy is activated (Tax not equal to zero), there is a sure hope that, not only 
the environmental stress is subsided but also there is a measure of good income for the government 
for other developmental projects thereafter. 
With environmental cost now a burden of the miners, the cost of producing a ton of gold will 
increase due to increase in expenses. It will increase proportional with the percentage of the tax 
charged. The higher the tax percentage, the lower the income after tax for the miners. This means 
less money is available to mining. This makes mining more expensive. But when the tax 
percentage is low, however, there will be a comparatively more income after tax since expenses is 
reduced. With excess money at hand due to less tax, more mining activities could be carried out 
increasing the number of mines being established. 
Figure 38 Cost of producing a ton of gold after policy in 2070 
Figure 37 
Figure 39 Rate of gold mining after policy in 2070 




The lesser the tax rate, the lesser the tax income the government will get, but the more the income 
after tax obtained by the miners. This situation is true on the reverse. 
However, as the number of mines increases, gold mining will increase, increasing the accumulated 
volume of gold produced. When more and more gold is produced, less and less gold reserve will 
remain, making it extra expensive to produce a ton of gold the next time due to gold scarcity. When 
cost of gold production is very high, the cost per capital for a mine or managing a mine site will 
be costly. This decreases the number of mines. 
Also, with a higher tax rate in place, this means more expenses is paid or better still, a higher cost 
of gold production is seen. This triggers less and less gold to be produced the next time. This means 
that, there will be ample gold reserves ready to be harvested the next time. With more gold reserves 
available, the cost of mining will decrease which triggers the increased in growth of number of 
mines. In other words, when cost of gold production is increased (due to increase in tax rate) 
initially, the cost of gold production will eventually become lower due to much gold reserves that 
will be available for mining in the future, and vice versa.   
So the steeper the rise in mining activity, the steeper the volume in the amount of gold produced, 
and the steeper the rise in number of mines. Soon thereafter, less gold will be available, quickly 






















There is a strong relationship between tax rate charged and profit the miners and the government 
alike accrue. This is depicted by the graphs 42 and 43. Graph 42 indicators the income benefits the 
government achieves through taxation. When the tax policy is activated in 2021, the government 
will begin to obtain income from the sector. The higher the tax rate, the more the taxes the miners 
pay. This reduces the income margin of the miners making the cost of gold production very high, 
but substantially increases the government’s initial income gotten from tax. With high cost of 
production, many mines’ investors may not be able to stay in operations. When this happens, the 
number of mines will grow at a decreasing rate. With decreased number of mines available now, 
the tax income of the government will grow at a decreasing rate since the amount of tax income is 
directly proportional to the number of active mines.  
On the other hand, the miners’ income after tax seems to enjoy a steady increase (proportional to 
the increase in mines growth) until the policy is activated in 2021. The more taxes the miners’ pay 
(after 2021), the lesser their income after tax and vice versa. For example, with 40% charged, the 
number of mines will grow decreasingly until 2023 when it begins to fall more rapidly. thereafter, 
the mines will decrease at a decreasing rate but will slow down its decline rate in a very gentle 
proportion until 2070. There will be about 778 mines available, accumulating a total of 38 billion 




USD for the government through tax and also a total of 76.5billion USD for the miners through 
income after tax.  
Also, with 10% tax rate charged, the number of mines (which is also true for the income level) 
will grow in will continue to increase initially until it slows down in its growth until about 2027. 
This will reduce the growth rate of the income after tax level. As number of mines decreases, the 
accumulated income level after tax will continue to grow more sluggishly until 2070. There will 
be around 1930 active mines by 2070, realizing a total of about 194 billion USD for miners as 
accumulated income after tax and 19.4 billion USD as accumulated tax income for the government. 
30% tax rate will result in about 1090 active mines, 37.3 billion USD accumulated tax income for 
the government and 106 billion USD accumulative income after tax for the miners by 2070. 
Also, 20% tax rate will result in 1480 active mines, 31.6 billion USD accumulative tax income for 
the government and 146 billion USD accumulative income after tax for the investors by 2070. 
However, the real threat lies in having no policy in place. When there is no policy, or when the tax 
rate is zero, the number of mines will grow more steeply initially and a bit slowly afterwards until 
2028 (more gold dug initially making it more expensive to mine another ton of gold afterwards). 
Thereafter, the number of mine will decline more swiftly (very limited gold reserves available 
hence much more expensive to mine). The boom-bust effect is so great with no policy in place. 
The intense decline in number of mines will slow down around 2040 after most of the mines are 
displaced. From 2041 onwards, the number of mines will continue its decline rate but in a more 
gradual manner. 
It is important to note that, there is a striking resemblance between the number of mines and the 
accumulated income of miners. So the swift rise and fall in the number of mines reflects perfectly 
on the accumulated income level of the investors. From 2041 onwards, the accumulated income 
level will barely see a rise in its level due to fewer and fewer mines being remained with the 
passage of time. The sector would have accumulated about 247 billion USD in 2045 but would 
only be able to have 4 billion USD extra from that time until 2070 when there are around only 16 
active mines remaining. The ridiculous aspect is that the government would have received 0 USD 




CHAPTER 6 DISCUSSION OF CONCLUSIONS FROM THE MODEL POLICY 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This study is conducted in the perspective of formalizing and maximizing the benefit of the small-
scale mining sector in Ghana. The study evaluates the motivating force behind the exponential 
growth rate of the number of mines involved in this business. By means of qualitative and 
quantitative secondary data collected, and also observation (since this researcher lived in a mining 
community in Ghana), a system of cause and effect relationships was designed to serve as the basis 
of this study. On this basis, a stock and flow diagram was developed to reproduce the historical 
reference mode through reasonable calibrations and structured validation tests. Insights from the 
simulation model were used to answer the research questions and ultimately the research objective. 
6.2 Answering the Research Question. 
The objective for this research is to find out why illegal gold mining in Ghana continues to flourish 
and how the small-scale mining sector can be formalized. To achieve this objective, the following 
questions were answered. 
a. Why does the illegal mining sector continue to flourish despite the government’s attempt 
to crack it down?  
b. Which robust policy can formalize the Artisanal Small-Scale Mining sector? 
c. How does formalization of the sector help to reduce the environmental challenges 
associated with the illegal mining sector? 
 
a. Why does the illegal mining sector continue to flourish despite the government’s attempt 
to crack it down?  
Due to its crucial importance to the jewel, finance and investing, electronic, aerospace and 
electronics industries among others, gold is a highly sought-after and highly regarded precious 




both local and foreign, into the mining sector of Ghana to start mining. Increase in number of 
mines proportionally increases the amount of money resulting from total revenue. With increased 
amount in revenue, and with no robust policy impeding the revenue growth, a high level of return 
on investment is realized. With a perceived high return on investment, a host of investors are lured 
into the venture consequently. This wheel is reinvented each year since the sector seems to be 
doing well resulting in an exponential growth. Exponential growth, nonetheless, is not sustainable. 
The increasing number of mines may soon cause the depletion of this gold resource, collapsing the 
sector eventually. (Breierova, 2007). This truly calls for a policy intervention. 
b. Which robust policy can formalize the Artisanal Small-Scale Mining sector? 
A gold resource, due to its limited quantity in nature, is susceptible to overshoot and collapse when 
being mined.  (Breierova, 2007). Its susceptibility to a collapse raises the concern of how well to 
formalize this sector, to get the most out of it before its eventual collapse. The government of 
Ghana in her attempt to regulate this sector introduced a crackdown policy, which made it 
extremely expensive to undergo mining operations due to the risk of having mining equipment. 
ceased (and even destroyed in some instances). 
This study has discovered that, introduction of the right amount of tax can equally limit the growth 
in the number of mines in the industry as crackdown. The tax however has an added advantage of 
recouping income for the country. When a reasonably higher tax rate is introduced, the miners are 
forced to pay more in expenses. In other words, the cost of gold production will be higher. Since 
staying in operation becomes expensive the number of investors will decrease.  This triggers a 
decrease in the volume of gold that is produced. This means that, there will be relatively enough 
gold reserves ready to be harvested the next time. This prolongs the overshoot and ultimately the 
collapse of the mining sector. Besides, tax incomes can help the government focus on building a 
substitute job opportunity to replace the mining business in the future. 
c. How does formalization of the sector help to reduce the environmental challenges 
associated with the illegal mining sector? 
The needless stress overwhelming the environment is also relieved when tax policy is introduced. 




just after a mine is exhausted. In the model, the burden of environmental cost is shifted on the 
investors as part of their expenses as soon as the policy is activated. The environment will 
continually be restored and cared for throughout the lifespan of the mining sector. In case of 
eventual collapse, farmers have recovered lands for cultivation which will reduce the 
unemployment rate. 
 
6.3 Limitations of The Model and Hints For Further Research 
A cogent and a diligent approach was employed in conducting this study. Also, system dynamic 
principles are carefully adhered to in building the model for this study. Inspite of these, there are 
shortcoming that limit the robustness of the study. These could be served as a foundation for further 
research. The limitations include the following. 
1. The model does not fully represent the ideal world condition of illegal mines in Ghana. 
Factors such as unemployment rate, corrupt nature of government official who supervise 
mining activities, availability and accessibility of land, the role of the media among others 
that influence illegal mining business in Ghana are missing in this study. 
2. Also, how other government intervening policies affect the operation of the sector are not 
accounted for by this study. Example, government policies such as galamsey court, drone 
technology supervision, alternate livelihood for those living in mining communities among 
others, to some extend have impacted how the sector is growing. 
3. Again, the amount of money (logistics and personnel) required to implement the proposed 
policy (tax) is not accounted for by this study. Implementation of this policy may not be 
ideal if the cost for implementation is equal to or larger than the amount gained from 
introducing the policy. That is the tax income. 
4. Since the whole business is conducted illegally, there is a general lack of accurate and 
verified data in regard to this industry. The following variables lack accurate data and may 




a.  The two graphical variables (effect of relative profit and effect of depleting gold on 
cost of mining) seem to have massive impact on the model and hence require further 
validation. 
b. There is no clear data about how much gold on average is produced by a small-scale 
mine each year. Accurate data on this may help us to have a more accurate insight about 
the profitability of the sector.  
c. The actual relationship between gold already produced (or volume of gold reserves 
remaining) and the cost of opening a new mine (or managing an existing mine) is made 
on assumption. Further research could be conducted to actualize the true relationship. 
 
6.4 CONCLUSION 
Illegal gold mine has been a thorn in the flesh of the country of Ghana. This unbridled rush for 
gold has unleashed inestimable damages to the economy of Ghana including child labor, 
environmental stress, loss of revenue, and health crises in mining communities. As a limited 
resource commodity, gold in Ghana will eventually get exhausted, either sooner or later. The ideal 
condition will therefore be to formalize the sector in a practically sustainable way. The many 
already failed policies are an indication that outright ban for mining illegally is extremely 
challenging. The people will definitely want to have their share in this common pool resource as 
precedence has shown. With the high returns on investment due to the high profitability nature of 
the illegal mines business, people are motivated to engage in it. Instead of a total preventive policy, 
like crackdown, that eventually compels people to steal the resource, the sector could satisfactorily 
be formalized using tax regulations. As proven by this study, introduction of tax policy can 
sustainably control the growth rate of the sector. It however has an added advantage of mitigating 
the environmental challenges associated with this sector and more importantly also generates 
revenue for the country. The tax policy ensures that, accepted regulations for mining are adhered 
to. This will minimize child labor and also reduce the use of harmful extraction ingredients such 
as mercury and cyanide. By using the self-organized approach of resource management, foreigners 




protect their territories. This will largely reduce the billions of dollar worth of gold that is smuggled 























APPENDIX A: SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
Variable Tested: Dealing fee fraction. 
This part of the study examines how various variable used in building the model affects the 
behavior the model exhibits. These variables are a little bit unknown. So a wide range of figures 
were checked, and the results reveal that, the behavior of the model is sensitive to these variables. 
Looking at the gravity of influence exerted by these variables on the behavior of the model, it is 
highly recommended that, these variables must be researched into. This can allow for a more robust 
conclusions and insights to be made from the model. 
 
RUN Dealing Fee Fraction 
Run 1 0.1 
Run 2 0.127777777778 
Run 3 0.155555555556 
Run 4 0.183333333333 
Run 5 0.211111111111 
Run 6 0.238888888889 
Run 7 0.266666666667 
Run 8 0.294444444444 
Run 9 0.322222222222 







RUN Required ROI 
Run 1 0.05 
Run 2 0.0666666666667 
Run 3 0.0833333333333 
Run 4 0.1 
Run 5 0.116666666667 
Run 6 0.133333333333 
Run 7 0.15 
Run 8 0.166666666667 
Run 9 0.183333333333 







Time to expand Sensitivity. 
 RUN Time to Expand 
Run 1 1 
Run 2 1.22222222222 
Run 3 1.44444444444 
Run 4 1.66666666667 
Run 5 1.88888888889 
Run 6 2.11111111111 
Run 7 2.33333333333 
Run 8 2.55555555556 
Run 9 2.77777777778 























































INTEREST RATE SENSITIVITY  
 interest rate 
Run 1 0.15 
Run 2 0.172222222222 
Run 3 0.194444444444 
Run 4 0.216666666667 
Run 5 0.238888888889 
Run 6 0.261111111111 
Run 7 0.283333333333 
Run 8 0.305555555556 
Run 9 0.327777777778 








BASE CAPITAL SENSITVITY 
 Base Capital per mine 
Run 1 6000 
Run 2 6444.44444444 
Run 3 6888.88888889 
Run 4 7333.33333333 
Run 5 7777.77777778 
Run 6 8222.22222222 
Run 7 8666.66666667 
Run 8 9111.11111111 
Run 9 9555.55555556 
Run 10 10000 
 
 




average lifetime of capital 
Run 1 15 
Run 2 16.1111111111 
Run 3 17.2222222222 
Run 4 18.3333333333 
Run 5 19.4444444444 
Run 6 20.5555555556 
Run 7 21.6666666667 
Run 8 22.7777777778 
Run 9 23.8888888889 




TIME TO EXPAND 




Run 1 1.5 
Run 2 1.61111111111 
Run 3 1.72222222222 
Run 4 1.83333333333 
Run 5 1.94444444444 
Run 6 2.05555555556 
Run 7 2.16666666667 
Run 8 2.27777777778 
Run 9 2.38888888889 




TON PER MINE PER REAR SENSITIVITY 
 tons per mine per year 




Run 2 0.00296555555556 
Run 3 0.00312111111111 
Run 4 0.00327666666667 
Run 5 0.00343222222222 
Run 6 0.00358777777778 
Run 7 0.00374333333333 
Run 8 0.00389888888889 
Run 9 0.00405444444444 





Mine Average Lifespan (Normal Time) 
 normal time 




Run 2 2.61111111111 
Run 3 2.72222222222 
Run 4 2.83333333333 
Run 5 2.94444444444 
Run 6 3.05555555556 
Run 7 3.16666666667 
Run 8 3.27777777778 
Run 9 3.38888888889 











MINE AVERAGE DESIRED LIFESPAN (POLICY ON) 
 policy desired time 
Run 1 8 
Run 2 8.44444444444 
Run 3 8.88888888889 
Run 4 9.33333333333 
Run 5 9.77777777778 
Run 6 10.2222222222 
Run 7 10.6666666667 
Run 8 11.1111111111 
Run 9 11.5555555556 








TAX RATE SENSITIVITY  
 tax rate 
Run 1 0.1 
Run 2 0.144444444444 
Run 3 0.188888888889 
Run 4 0.233333333333 
Run 5 0.277777777778 
Run 6 0.322222222222 
Run 7 0.366666666667 
Run 8 0.411111111111 
Run 9 0.455555555556 








APENDIX B: DOCUMENTATION 
 
Description of Variable  Units 
Name: Accumulated Environmental cost 
 
Equation:  
Accumulated_Environmental_cost (t - dt) + 




This represents the total amount of money needed to reclaim lost or degraded 
land by the sector 
USD 
Name: Accumulated Gold Produced. 
 
Equation: 
Accumulated_gold_produced (t - dt) + (Mining) * dt.  
 
Description 
This represents the total amount of gold mined every year 
Tons 
Name: Accumulated Income After Tax. 
 
Equation: 




This represents the total profit generated by miners in the sector 
USD 
Name: Accumulated Tax Incomes 
 
Equation:  
Accumulated_tax_incomes (t - dt) + (accumulating_tax_income) * dt. 
 
Description 
This represents the total amount of profit generated from tax from the sector 
USD 
Name: Accumulated Wages 
 
Equation:  









This amounts to the total amount of money paid to workers within the years 
under consideration 
Name: Forest and farmland. 
 
Equation: 
Forest_and_farm_land (t - dt) + (afforestation - forest_depletion) * dt. 
  
Description 
This accounts for the total land size of Ghana. It is initialized with 23853500. 
 
Source: Mapping and Monitoring Small-Scale Mining Activities 
in Ghana using Sentinel-1 Time Series (2015–2019) 
Gerald Forkuor, Tobias Ullmann 2 and Mario Griesbeck 2  






Mines (t - dt) + (opening_mine - closing_mine) * dt. 
  
Description 
this refers to the total number of active mines in place at any time within the 
years under consideration. it is measured in mine.  
Mine 
Name: Unusable Land 
 
Equation:  
Unusable_land (t - dt) + (forest_depletion - afforestation) * dt. 
 
Description 
this refers to the mass of land that is not good for cultivation because of its 
degradation by galamsey activities. this mass of land is highly eroded and lying 
idle 
Hectares 






This refers to the rate of accumulating environmental cost 
USD /Year 










This refers to the rate by which income after tax is accumulated.  






This represents the rate of accumulating the profit from tax 
USD /Year 















This accounts for the actual regrowth process of the depleted land into a farm or 
forested land. It alternates between the natural regrowth process and tree 
planting. When switch is on, then the tree planting as a policy is activated and 
vice versa.  
Hectares/Year 
this refers to the annual reduction in the number of active illegal mines in place. 
This reduction is accounted for by the annual drop out fraction times the 
average lifespan of the mines times the number of active illegal mines. it is 
measured in operation per year 
Mine/Years 










This refers to the rate of land degradation. This start or intensifies when a new 










This represents the rate at which gold is mined annually. 
  
Tons/Years 
Name: Opening Mine 
 
Equation: 




this refers to the number of mines that are created or opened each year. 
it is measured in operation per year.  
Mine/Years 






This represents a conversion from acres to hectares 
 
Sources: https://housing.com/calculators/hectare-to-acre.  
Acres/Hectare 






this represents the total number of hectares of abandoned land.  
Hectares/Year 












It is the actual Return on Investment income given any year divided by the total 
amount invested to produce that income in that year 
Name: Afforestation policy 
 
Equation:  
IF TIME > 2021 THEN afforestation_policy_switch ELSE 0 
 
Description 












This is a switch that regulates (activates or deactivates) the afforestation policy. 
It has two values, 0 and 1. It activates turns on the policy when it is 1 and turns 
it off when it is 0. It has no dimension 
Dimensionless. 
Name: Average gold mined by large mine per year. 
 
Equation:  
GRAPH(TIME) Points: (2004.00, 58.71927), (2005.00, 59.49828), (2006.00, 
62.13713), (2007.00, 71.0243), (2008.00, 68.42755), (2009.00, 55.61076), 
(2010.00, 58.77564), (2011.00, 60.29654), (2012.00, 57.40152), (2013.00, 
85.7984), (2014.00, 88.256), (2015.00, 91.48725), (2016.00, 77.00152), 




This refers to the average amount of gold mines by the large mines sector of 
Ghana every year 
 
 













this refers to the volume of ounces of gold produced by each mine on a yearly 
basis  
 
It is measured in ounce/mine/year 
 
Source: It is derived from a figure given by LEUDI (Leudi, 2019)  
Ounce/Mine/Year 






this refers to the average time it takes for machines, money and other 
equipment invested initially into the mines to become no more usable. 
 
Source: (Assore, n.d.) 
Years 








This shows the converted value of hectares from acres. 
10.1 acres are equivalent to 1 hectare 
 
Source: https://housing.com/calculators/hectare-to-acre.  
Hectares/Mine 



















this refers to the total amount of money invested in the illegal mining operation 
in Ghana. it is the product of capital per mine and the total number of illegal 
mines available. It is measured in USD 
USD 






the actual capital per mine calculated by taking the base capital per mine 
multiply by the index.  
USD/Mine 






This accounts for how much money is required to reclaim all unusable land. It 








this refers to the total amount of money required to reclaim available abandoned 
hectares of degraded land. It is a product of how much it cost to reclaim a 
hectare of land and the total hectares of land available to be reclaimed. 
USD/Year 










this refers to the amount of money spent on payment of interest.  
Name: Cost per ton 
 









MIN ((STEP(6.7, 2013) + STEP(-6.7, 2015)) *1e8, total_revenue) 
 
Description 
This was an intervention strategy implemented by the government to halt the 
operation of the illegal mining sector in 2014.It came as a huge cost to the 
sector as many excavators, water pumps and other mining equipment were 
seized and or destroyed by the government 
USD/Year 






this represents gold transaction cost. This refers to the fraction of the revenue 
lost when miners sell gold to dealers or middlemen 
source: (Lawson, 2015)  
Dimensionless. 













Delayed time refers to the average time it takes to regrow the depleted forest 
Year 










a third order exponential delay process of the land as it is retired due to mines 
closing their operations 






This represents the average lifespan of a mine when it is mined illegally. The 
average mine of a galamsey mine is 3 years according to Leudi. 
 
Source: Galamsey in Ghana and China's illegal gold rush 
JANUARY 16, 2019 
By: Jeremy Luedi 
USD/Year 
Name: Effect of depleting gold on cost of mining 
 
Equation:  
GRAPH(Accumulated_gold_produced) Points: (0, 1.000), (107.142857143, 
1.066), (214.285714286, 1.132), (321.428571429, 1.211), (428.571428571, 
1.276), (535.714285714, 1.316), (642.857142857, 1.395), (750, 1.447), 
(857.142857143, 1.526), (964.285714286, 1.632), (1071.42857143, 1.711), 




This refers to the effect of depleting gold on the cost of mining. The more 
readily available gold deposits are, the cheaper they are to mine and vice versa.  
Dimensionless. 
Name: Effect of relative profit 
 
Equation:  
GRAPH(Relative_ROI) Points: (0.0, 0.000), (10.9090909091, 
0.558978986139), (21.8181818182, 0.947549834455), (32.7272727273, 
1.21766250042), (43.6363636364, 1.40542968014), (54.5454545455, 
1.53595489508), (65.4545454545, 1.62668870575), (76.3636363636, 
1.68976176333), (87.2727272727, 1.73360661636), (98.1818181818, 







This accounts for the attractiveness, or the attractive power of the mining sector 
based on how profitable is seems. The more the profit, the more it attracts new 
investors and vice versa. For any value from negative to 1, the ROI is not 
adequate enough and hence the sector is not attractive enough to attract new 
investors. this means that the indicated mines will be 0 






This represents the amount of money needed by the miners to maintain or 
reclaim the environment 
USD/Year 














This is the total annual profit accrued from the mining sector before paying of 
tax. 
USD/Year 






this refers to the number of mines expected to be established based on the 
number of investors arrived and average number of investors per operation. 
Mine 










this refers to the assumed interest rate on the capital used in the industry 









this refers to the amount of money required to reclaim one hectare of degraded 












This refers to the average total land area (in hectares) occupied by the active 
mines at any time. 
Hectares 
Name: Mines Average Lifespan 
 
Equation:  
normal_time*(1-Policy) + policy_desired_time*Policy 
 
Description 
this refers to the total time within which a mine stays active. When this time is 
over or exhausted, the mine cease to operate. 
Year 







This refers to the output of the absolute benefit of the mining sector. Positive of 
results means the sector is good and negative results means otherwise. 
USD 









this refers to the total amount (total revenue) left after expenses. it is calculated 
by subtracting expense from the total revenue. it is measured in USD 






This accounts for the average land size in hectare that the yearly new mines 
occupy 
Hectares/Year 






Desired time This represents the average lifespan of a mine when it is mined 
illegally. Averagely, it takes a total of 10 years for a legal small-scale mine to 
stay in operation.  
USD/Year 






This represents the average lifespan of a mine when it is mined illegally. The 
average mine of a galamsey mine is 3 years according to Leudi. 
 
Galamsey in Ghana and China's illegal gold rush 
JANUARY 16, 2019 
By: Jeremy Luedi  
Year 
Name: Number of galamsey 
 
Equation:  
GRAPH(TIME) Points: (2004.00, 1299.920588), (2005.00, 2162.858824), 
(2006.00, 2258.785294), (2007.00, 3686.382353), (2008.00, 3551.602941), 
(2009.00, 3590.364706), (2010.00, 5163.635294), (2011.00, 6559.252941), 





9952.279412), (2016.00, 13880.72941), (2017.00, 14633.37353), (2018.00, 










This refers to the number of laborers who work in the illegal mines sector. It is 
estimated that every mine has an average of 150 employees. It is measured in 
person per mine 
Person/Mine 






Expenses incurred by each mine every year 
USD/Mine/Year 






This refers to the conversion of gold produced from ounce to tons. 1 ton of gold 





IF TIME>2021 THEN policy_switch = 1 ELSE 0 
 
Description 
It produces the value of the lifespan policy switch from the years 2014 
onwards. 
Dimensionless. 










Desired time This represents the average lifespan of a mine when it is mined 
illegally. Averagely, it takes a total of 10 years for a legal small-scale mine to 
stay in operation 






policy switch of the lifespan of a mine policy. The policy is activated when 
switched on and vice versa 
Dimensionless. 
Name:  Policy tax rate 
 
Equation:  
IF TIME > 2021 THEN tax_rate_switch*tax_rate ELSE 0 
 
Description 





IF TIME < 2018 THEN price_of_gold ELSE 1800 
 
Description 
this refers to the price of the historical price of gold from 2004 to 2018 where 
historical data is available. From 2018 onwards, it assumes a constant figure or 
number of 1800 USD/Ounce. 
USD/Ounce 
Name: Price of Gold 
 
Equation:  
GRAPH(TIME) Points: (2004.00, 442.974), (2005.00, 509.423), (2006.00, 
629.513), (2007.00, 803.618), (2008.00, 819.94), (2009.00, 1135.012), 
(2010.00, 1393.512), (2011.00, 1652.725), (2012.00, 1687.342), (2013.00, 
1221.588), (2014.00, 1200.44), (2015.00, 1068.317), (2016.00, 1152.165), 
(2017.00, 1265.674), (2018.00, 1249.887) 
 
Description 








Name: Relative ROI 
 
Equation:  
MAX (0, actual_return_on_investment//required_ROI) 
 
Description 
the actual expressed as a percentage of the required 
Dimensionless. 






this refers to the percentage of the total amount invested that an investor would 
need to earn each year in profit to make it a worthwhile investment 
1/Year 






This refers to the average mines size measured in acres. It is initialized with 25 
being the average size of a mine in Ghana.  
Source: Ghana’s battle with illegal artisanal and small-scale mining 
by: Marie-Noelle Nwokolo. 











This shows the results of income gotten from tax. 
USD/Year 










This refers to the percentage of income that the government charges on the total 
income of miners. It has no dimension. 






This is a switch that regulates (activates or deactivates) the tax policy. It has 
two values, 0 and 1. It activates turns on the tax policy when it is 1 and turns it 
off when it is 0. It has no dimension 
Dimensionless. 






This accounts for the time taken for investor to fully get a mine site operational. 
It is measured in years 
Year 






Delayed time refers to the average time it takes to regrow the depleted forest 
Year 






This is the average time it takes for the degraded land to naturally grow back to 
become a forest 
Year 






this refers to the volume of Tons of gold produced by each mine on a yearly 






Source is derived from a figure given by LEUDI (Leudi, 2019). 













This refers to the total cost incurred every year for the operations of the mining 
sector in Ghana 
USD/Year 






This represents the total amount of gold mined each year by the small-scale 
mines sector 
Tons/Years 













This refers to the total number of persons in the illegal gold mines sector. It is 
assumed that every mine is owned by one person/investor who in turn employs 
some number of people as laborers. It is equivalent to the number of illegal 
mines in place times the total number of workers employed. It is measured in 
person 
Person 






normal_expenses*(1-Policy) + desired_expenses*Policy 
 
Description 
This represents the total expenses incurred annually by the sector 







this refers to the total amount of gross income generated from the illegal mining 
operations in a year. it is generated by the number of illegal mines times the 
price of gold times the quantity of gold mined.   
USD/Year 










Total Count Including Array Elements 
Variables 83 83 
Sectors 4  
Stocks 8 8 
Flows 9 9 
Converters 66 66 
Constants 25 25 
Equations 50 50 
Graphical 5 5 







Start Time 2004 
Stop Time 2070 
DT 1/32 
Fractional DT True 
Save Interval 0.03125 
Sim Duration 1.5 
Time Units years 
Pause Interval 0 
Integration Method Euler 
Keep all variable results True 
Run By Run 
Calculate loop dominance information True 
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